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- Abstract - 
The western Marxist tradition identifies the active engagement of human beings 
with their environment and with each other as a central ontological category. This 
physical, verbal and cognitive engagement is embodied through skill: the practical 
availability of what are often prediscursive modes of action, generated in collective 
learning processes such as conflict or alliance, materially sedimented in experience, 
practices, language, networks and so on, and thus continually subject to 
transformation or loss, but also constantly available as a resource for creative action. 
Movements, from above or below, are then different possible "proto-hegemonic" 
attempts at developing this potential from different starting-points and mobilising it 
around shared social projects and against others. 
Strategies of research into movement contexts parallel these possible organising 
modes: given the diversity of participants' orientations and of external interventions, 
there is necessarily a politics of research characterised by collusion with some 
participants' knowledge interests and conflict with others. The paper draws on 
Gramsci's conceptualisation of class consciousness to argue for a critical realism that 
extends the logic implicit in participants' skilled activity to a more comprehensive 
standpoint, using the researchers' own standpoint and knowledge interests critically 
as a part of this dialogue. The use of metaphor, illustration and other 
"hegemonising" strategies are geared to developing this two-way communication 
between different knowledge interests, which remains precarious unless it is 
developed into the coordination of shared activity. 
Such a politics of knowledge makes sense only given particular starting-points. A 
concrete example is given in the case of my own research, which moved from a 
participant's developing choice of priorities to a traditional intellectual's attempt to 
relate the milieu to externally-determined projects. The class and other relations 
involved in this process are examined critically, with a view to bringing out the 
ability of participants to "locate" the researcher and fit my activity in turn into their 
own perspectives and projects. The cognitive implications of this analysis enable a 
more complex understanding of such research activity and point to important 
political and ethical issues around the potential value and limitations of research for 
participants and researchers alike. 
Gramsci, movements and method: the politics of 
activist research 
This paper begins with a paradox in social movement theory, moves backwards to 
an ontology of human existence, then forwards to outline a political epistemology, 
and concludes with the history of a research process. Worse, the maps it uses to 
explore this complex territory are those of an idiosyncratic collection of theorists 
who are on the whole neither the focus of much serious intellectual attention nor 
commonly seen as relevant to the discussion of social movements (with one or two 
exceptions in each case). To complicate matters further, these maps are themselves 
based on my speculative reconstruction of what I take to be the shared assumptions 
of this unlikely and heterogenous group of thinkers. The only justification for this 
paper is that it attempts at least to sketch out a possible perspective on some 
theoretical and methodological problems raised by research into contemporary 
social movements. If this perspective is convincing, it may help think about some old 
problems in a new light; if not, the questions asked may be large enough to provoke 
better answers from other points of view (1). 
The case of the missing theory 
The paradox in question is that of the Marxist theory of social movements, or more 
accurately the lack of such a theory. It is not, of course, that Marxist writing on 
social movements does not exist; but rather that to the best of my knowledge no 
systematic attempt has been made to formulate a Marxist theory of social 
movements. What is by now the standard analysis of the field identifies an 
"American" mode of theorising, with roots in rational choice theory, and a 
"European" mode of theorising, normally seen as "post-Marxist" in its stress on the 
development of "new social movements" (cf. Cohen 1985, Diani 1992); it is 
commonly argued that these perspectives are now converging, though what this 
means theoretically is far from clear (Melucci 1989). These are not, of course, the 
only options on offer; recent years have seen the publication of Weberian (Scott 
1990), cognitivist (Eyerman and Jamison 1991), culturalist (Eder 1993) and state-
centred (Foweraker 1995) analyses, among others. Yet, acknowledging a steady 
stream of Marxist critiques of the concept of "new social movements" (Bagguley 
1992, Barker and Dale 1997), the only systematic theoretical formulation on social 
movements from anything like a Marxist position would seem to be the body of 
writing associated with contemporary critical theory (Habermas 1984, 1987, Offe 
1985, Cohen 1982, 1996), which asserts an essentially liberal view of social 
movements as the defence of civil society and of the life-world. 
The paradox here is of course that Marxism has frequently identified itself as a 
theory from and for social movements: at once a theoretical reflection on the 
experience of the workers' movement and a source of analyses for the use of that 
movement (2). How is it, then, that this "social movement theory" possesses no 
"social movement theory" of its own, no separate and coherent body of theory which 
could define the nature of social movements, explain their existence, analyse their 
development and theorise their effects? What can one say of a theory which is no 
longer capable of reflecting on its own conditions of existence, and whose 
contribution to the analysis of contemporary movements is limited to the chimerical 
pursuit of a homogenous and objective class basis to their existence and the drawing 
of undemonstrable assumptions about the revolutionary potential or otherwise of 
such movements? 
I think one might say that both this imagined critique and much actual Marxist 
writing on social movements are, to a greater or lesser extent, missing the point. It is 
a mistake to think that there is no Marxist theory of social movements, and that 
Marxists therefore have the choice between ignoring such movements, denying 
their relevance, reducing them to something else or adopting mainstream theories 
either wholesale or piecemeal. The argument I want to develop in the first part of 
this paper is rather that Marxism is a theory of social movements; and, perhaps, 
nothing else. 
The Heraclitean perspective 
A first glimpse of what this might mean can be offered by the first section of the 
Communist Manifesto, with its dramatic claim that "The history of all human 
society, past and present, has been the history of class struggles" (cited from the 
Ryazanoff edition in Mills 1962: 47). This claim is developed into an analysis of the 
revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie in the destruction of feudalism and the 
creation of a new world order, transforming economics and technology, national 
and international politics, communications and cognition; following this, by the 
analysis of the development of the workers' movement from the experience of 
misery to the struggle against oppression, aided by growing concentration and 
communication, into a complex learning process of increasing political self-
confidence and clarity towards another and final revolution. It would be more than 
possible to distil from these few pages the presuppositions of a general Marxist 
theory of social movements which was not other than the Marxist theory of history - 
but paying perhaps more attention to the discussion of the nature of movement 
activity, its preconditions and the context of its development towards the reshaping 
of society than has sometimes been the case. 
For the purposes of this paper, however, I want to draw on what for lack of a better 
phrase I shall call western Marxism (Jay 1984, Gottlieb 1989): a body of thought 
which distinguishes itself within the Marxist tradition by its strongly activist and 
humanist turn of thought, and its consistent rejection of structuralist and fatalist 
points of view (3). I am not, obviously, claiming that this is the only perspective 
from which one can see Marxism as a theory of social movements; but simply that it 
is a position from which it is easy to see what this might mean in practice. 
As the title of this paper indicates, the most developed expression of this point of 
view is Gramsci's (1971, 1991), and my reconstruction of western Marxism as a 
theory of social movements depends in particular on my reading of Gramsci and the 
associated positions of Williams (1980, 1985). The other defining author within 
this tradition is the young Luk (1971), who develops a movement-centred 
ontology and epistemology which is elaborated further by Touraine (1981), despite 
the latter's abandonment of the Marxist periodisation of history. I would add two 
other sources for this reconstruction: Thompson's (1963, 1993) analysis of 
working-class history, theorised further by Vester (1975), and Wainwright's (1994) 
movement-oriented theory of knowledge (4). 
The guiding thread which I think runs through these theories is a commitment to a 
view of history as nothing other than the product of human activity; and, more 
specifically, as the product of collective human action, articulated in conflicts which 
encompass the totality of society and in turn define that totality; conflicts which are 
not only grounded ultimately in the material activity of human beings but are at the 
same time conflicts over how that activity is to develop. In other words, I am 
arguing that western Marxism, so defined, is a theory of social movements, and one 
which elevates social movements to the central, perhaps the only, feature of the 
historical process and the social structure. 
It could be argued that this in fact represents a correct reading of Marxism in 
general, but this is not central to my argument either way. It is sufficient to note 
what this perspective does, and does not, involve. Clearly it does not leave any space 
for an analysis which sees economic or social structure as anything other than the 
result of human practices, which would treat them as somehow extra-social. 
Similarly, it excludes the possibility of reifying power, the state, rationality, 
discourse etc. as pre- or supra-social. In other words, it is a thorough-going 
historicism and humanism which treats all features of the social world as in the last 
analysis the product of collective and conflictual human practices, or in other words 
of social movements. 
Class and hegemony 
Within the western Marxist tradition, two names in particular have been given to 
these practices, concepts which I am arguing represent the Marxist version of a 
theory of social movements. These concepts are social class, in particular class-for-
itself or class culture, and hegemony. In one formulation, which can best be 
identified in Luk and Touraine, social movements are class movements in the sense 
that they are essentially movements of one class only; they represent a subordinate 
class coming to consciousness of its own situation and interests and expressing that 
consciousness in conflict with a dominant class which has already achieved this 
level of self-awareness and self-organisation. In Gramsci's formulation, however, 
social movements are class movements in the rather different sense that they are 
movements led by a single class or social formations representing that class; they 
entail an interaction between the way in which a given class organises its own 
activities and the way in which it organises the practices of other social classes. Can 
these positions be reconciled? 
One possible answer is that they can be combined if Gramsci's formulation is 
weakened to the point of representing a purely external alliance between the formal 
organisations and leadership 鬩tes of essentially separately organised social classes. 
Such situations do undoubtedly occur; a case in point might be the alliance between 
the Swedish workers' and peasants' movements in the 1930s, an alliance which 
entailed agreement on the basic outlines of the new social order but left separate 
parties which even identified themselves with different possible governnments. At 
this level, however, the "hegemony" of the Swedish workers' movement over the 
peasant movement was no different from its relations with the representatives of 
capital - a relationship which might be identified as compromise or even consensus, 
but hardly as hegemony in Gramsci's sense. 
A more plausible and consistent answer would be a historicising one. On this view, 
it might be said, it is unlikely but not impossible that a class could develop into a 
"class-for-itself" without at the same time achieving some measure of hegemony 
over other social classes. This double articulation is of course the normal situation 
for a ruling class; its active side is expressed by Gramsci's concept of a "passive 
revolution" or "revolution from above". A ruling class which fails to maintain this 
hegemony is almost by definition in deep crisis. From the other side, Thompson's 
account of the "making of the English working class" identifies the important role 
played in this process by a "demotic culture", including important elements of the 
petty bourgeoisie; Gramsci's analysis of the need to build links between the working 
class and the peasantry points in the same direction. (Everything depends, of course, 
on the question of who is exercising hegemony over whom in such situations, as the 
post-war history of the PCI illustrates.) It is, however, not impossible under unusual 
circumstances for a class to attain a high level of self-organisation in isolation, as 
the example of the SPD in Bismarck's Germany suggests; the case of the PCF in 
contemporary France points to the possibility of such a situation arising precisely as 
the result of a loss of hegemony. 
If nothing else, I think the problematic nature of these examples illustrates the way 
in which western Marxist theories of social movements raise central questions about 
the totality of power relationships and modes of social organisation within 
particular states. When they are extended, as I think they must be, to the level of an 
entire society or "economic world-system", to borrow Wallerstein's phrase, we are 
starting to ask the kinds of questions which should be central to a Marxist 
understanding of contemporary society. To name contemporary attempts at 
answering even some of these questions is simultaneously to identify how complex 
the challenge is: for movements from above, Harvey (1990), Lash and Urry (1987), 
or Sklair (1995); for movements from below, Katsiaficas (1987) and Arrighi, 
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1989) offer starting points. In particular, Katsiaficas' 
discussion of "world-historical movements" (1987: 6) is an ambitious pointer to 
how much remains to be done, not only theoretically but practically. 
Implications for social movement theory 
If we give the name of social movements to these collective practices, we are taking 
quite a different tack from conventional "American" theories of social movements in 
three respects at least (5). This suggests, incidentally, that attempts to combine 
theories of "strategy" and "identity" (Cohen 1985, Melucci 1989, Diani 1992) are 
fundamentally flawed, as are attempts to compare them as if they were talking 
about the same thing (Scott 1990). The field identified by the two approaches is only 
partially comparable, if at all: the strategic approach assumes the stable 
continuation of existing social categories - something which is at least placed in 
question by the critical theory approach. The western Marxist analysis, however, 
sets itself the goal of understanding the totality of social conflict, placing any 
particular manifestation within this broader context and asking after its ability to 
transform social categories and the relations between them. 
This is then the first difference to be mentioned: social movements are not seen as 
unusual phenomena in need of particular explanation, occasional blips on the 
otherwise passive or institutionalised landscape of society. Rather, situations of 
passivity and institutionalisation just as much as situations of activity and 
unconventional practices need to be seen as part and parcel of an actively created 
and maintained dynamic tension between opposing social forces. One of the great 
merits of this perspective has been to open up new areas of social life for analysis: to 
mention Gramsci, Thompson and Williams is simultaneously to point to the 
intellectual preconditions for the cultural studies project. Social movements, then, 
are the way in which human practices are socially articulated. 
Secondly, social movements include not only the actions of the dominated and 
exploited, but also the actions of those who dominate and exploit - including, 
centrally, the practices of exploitation and domination themselves. The changing 
relations of ownership (identified in feudal society by Marc Bloch (1961)) and the 
changing form of the state in capitalism, just as much as the developing forms of 
political and cultural organisation from below, are forms of collective practice 
geared to maintaining or transforming social relations. Social movements, then, 
come not only "from below", but also "from above" - and the presence of the latter is 
rather more systematic than that of the former. 
Thirdly, social movements are not identified with any one kind of social 
phenomenon. They are neither specific features of a political subsystem, for 
example, nor particular forms of unconventional organisation. Or rather, they may 
at times be expressed in these ways, but they may equally be found in the normal 
movements of capital, the everyday organisation of needs and desires, the 
thoroughly institutionalised relationships of corporatism. A good example of this 
openness of form, I think, can be found in the juxtaposition of papers from a session 
at last year's conference. Colin Barker's (1997) discussion of "moments of collective 
effervescence" examined those powerful moments during which social movements 
from below are capable of mobilising vast masses of people in dramatic challenges 
to the status quo. Mike Waite's (1997) analysis of "flecks and carriers" included 
among other things a discussion of how movement ideas and experiences survive 
even in the worst periods of drought and on the stoniest ground. My own paper 
(Cox 1997) discussed relatively stable "movement milieux" in a time of active, but 
limited, social movements. From the perspective of the movement as a totality, all of 
these are important "moments" of a given history. Thus this perspective historicises 
movement activity over the lifetime of any given movement; it also historicises it, 
however, over the longer term, as against analyses of supposed "cycles" of movement 
activity (Brand 1982) or inherent "logics", for example of institutionalisation (Scott 
1990), which attempt to insulate the categories of movement activity from longer 
processes of historical change. Social movements, then, are not static forms, but 
change in both short and long historical movements in interaction with their 
opponents. 
Researching social movements 
If, then, we cannot know a prior what form social movements take, if they can 
neither be identified exclusively with unconventional political activity nor with 
politics from below, what is movement research to look for? The logic of the 
argument I am outlining is that we need to start from more general categories and 
work our way towards specific analyses of the shape movement activity takes in 
particular times and places. I want to suggest two such categories in particular. If 
social movements are the way in which human practices are socially articulated, 
they can and perhaps must be approached both from the foundational level of the 
practices being articulated and from the viewpoint of the totality within which, and 
oriented towards which, this articulation takes place. One way of making this 
connection, which I have presented elsewhere (Cox forthcoming), is in terms of 
"local rationalities" elaborated in specific movement milieux. Such rationalities 
represent an elaboration, a formalisation and a decontextualisation of particular 
practical (material and social) skills developed in particular social locations; this 
decontextualisation enables the generalisation of such rationalities as means of 
articulating multiple social milieux dispersed spatially, socially and even temporally. 
One example of such a rationality - an extremely powerful one - is the abstract 
form of capital, which moves from particular forms of local calculation to a 
"capitalist rationality" capable of coordinating a global economic system. Another 
such rationality is that known within the Marxist tradition as working-class 
consciousness, whose formalisation and generalisation of course includes Marxism 
and the workers' movement. 
One difficulty with this language, however, is that "rationality", within the 
Weberian tradition, has the implication of a formally-given possibility and a logic 
capable of self-generation and self-reproduction, rather than - in keeping with the 
argument I am outlining - the hegemonic project of specific social actors, and one 
which is capable of being both logically and practically self-contradictory (6). I 
therefore suggest the following working definition: A social movement is the 
organisation of multiple forms of locally generated skilled activity around a 
rationality expressed and organised by would-be hegemonic actors, and against the 
hegemonic projects articulated by other such actors. To avoid confusion, I propose 
to reserve the word hegemony to the analysis of dominant social projects, and to 
describe challenges from below as "counter-hegemonic" to express the normally 
weaker and more fragile articulation of subordinate projects. 
Before moving to a discussion of research on hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
projects as seen from the "viewpoint of totality", however, we need an analysis of 
what it is that these projects mobilise, organise and express: a heuristic means of 
theorising the foundational level of human practices. I want to propose the category 
of skill to approach this problem, and show (A) how it connects to western Marxist 
theorisations of human practice; (B) how it is materially embodied; and (C) how it 
leads directly into the generation of social movements. 
The nature of skill 
(A) My analysis of skill derives from Gramsci's discussion of the nature of human 
activity: 
"The active mass human being acts practically, but does not have a 
clear theoretical consciousness of this activity, which is however a 
knowledge of the world, in that it transforms it. In fact, their 
theoretical consciousness can be historically in contrast with their 
practical activity. It can almost be said that they have two theoretical 
consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness): one implicit in 
their activity and which truly unites them with all their collaborators 
in the practical transformation of reality; and one which is 
superficially explicit or verbal, which they have inherited from the 
past and have accepted without criticism. Nevertheless, this 'verbal' 
consciousness is not without consequences: it connects them to a 
given social group and influences them in their moral conduct and in 
the direction of their will, in more or less energetic ways, which can 
lead to a point in which the contradictory nature of their 
consciousness does not permit any action, any decision or any choice, 
and produces a situation of moral and political passivity. Critical self-
understanding thus comes about via a struggle of political 
'hegemonies', of opposing forms of direction, first in the field of 
ethics, then in that of politics, to arrive at a superior elaboration of 
their own conception of the real." (Gramsci 1991: 13) 
Using the category of "skill" to analyse this practical activity has the advantage of 
representing the engagement of human beings with their environment and with 
each other as something active, practical and creative, something which cannot be 
taken for granted or automatically reduced to some externally-given feature of the 
natural environment; to put this another way, it identifies a "mode of production" as 
an active, collective (and conflictual) way of doing things, something learnt and 
developed over time - and by implication something open to challenge. 
(B) This enables a connection to be made between this general ontology and a 
specific historical analysis of institutions. Since Berger and Luckmann (1967), it is 
clear that institutions cannot exist without knowledgeable human activity; it might 
be better to say that institutions or practices are a means of making practically 
available given modes of skilled activity, in the sense that they make the 
reproduction of production possible. These modes of skilled activity, as Gramsci 
observes, can be prediscursive in the sense that they contradict currently hegemonic 
means of talking and organising; they can also, however, become prediscursive 
through retraditionalisation, in the sense that they are sufficiently institutionalised 
no longer to need verbal explanation, and in some cases form such a part of "taken-
for-granted" common sense that they become abstracted from communicative 
contexts altogether (consider Habermas' (1984, 1987) analysis of how money and 
power become sufficient to themselves, beyond the reach of any "lifeworld" 
understanding). This need not be the case, of course: language is one form in which 
skilled activity can be sedimented (consider the practical orientations embodied in 
the languages used to discuss emotion, ethics, and kinship), but only one form 
among several. 
On an aside, this analysis of institutions as skilled activity has interesting 
implications. It makes it possible to discuss the ways in which such skill can be lost - 
not only in contexts of deskilling and the obsolescence of traditional forms of skill, 
but also for example in periods of reaction, which consist among other things in a 
sustained assault on the institutions that embody the skills of subordinate 
movements and classes: from political parties and the movement media through to 
what Gramsci defines elsewhere as the basic mode of reception of a social 
movement: "a conception of the world with a corresponding ethics". Even the us / 
them distinction, and basic ethical categories such as solidarity, then, are 
sedimentations of skilled ways of understanding and responding to the world, and 
as such subject to erosion and attack. 
(C) This points to the third element of the analysis, which is to see human activity as 
practical learning activity. If skill can be lost, it can also be developed; whether 
practically, in direct interaction with the natural and social world, or indirectly, for 
example by transmission of particular modes of organising social movements and of 
thinking about politics. The point of Marxist theory, and socialist organisations, 
within the workers' movement is arguably precisely to enable such indirect 
learning, to avoid having to reinvent the wheel. Social movements are a privileged 
case of such learning, as Vester's (1975) analysis of Thompson's The making of the 
English working class seeks to establish. Vester argues that social movements 
represent "collective learning processes", in which the elements Marx analyses as 
key to class conflict - an increasingly clearer self-understanding, a fuller grasp of 
social structure and historical process, and an increasingly adequate mode of 
organisation and struggle - are generated in the conflict with a movement's 
opponents. The history of recent decades suggests that skill can be lost as well as 
developed. Hilary Wainwright's (1994) analysis of the "politics of knowledge" of 
social movements also points, I think, in this direction, as does, from an earlier age, 
Banks' analysis of social movements as a form of "social technology" (1972). As we 
shall shortly see, this is not all social movements are; but these points should be 
enough to establish an internal link from the bases of skilled activity to the 
articulation of social movements. 
A practical illustration of the nature of this category of skill in social movement 
contexts can be given from my own interviews into social movement activists. Four 
different institutional locations were particularly mentioned in these interviews: the 
Dublin movement scene for its opportunity to learn from other people's experience, 
the London squatting scene for the development of practical skills, literature on the 
American 1960s as a source for indirect experience of social change, and 
interaction among engineering, computer and physics students geared towards 
solving technical problems. One particular discussion centred on the book Ideal 
Home (Suspect 1986), produced by London anarchists as a guide to squatting and 
travelling, and described by Irish squatters in the following terms: 
Mick: It's a remarkable book, you really should read through it. "How 
to break and enter." [laughs] Cheers! [laughter] Legally. You know, 
it's like, covers the complete legal situation on it, the com, everything. 
Shane: What's it, it's just called Ideal Home? 
Mick: It's called Ideal Homes, yeah. It's er, you know, "how to squat: 
the law". "Thankyou!" [laughs]  
Shane: D'you remember that -book? 
Mick: I forget who used to, it's Crowbar 
Shane: Right 
Mick: It was a squatters' organisation. -Crowbar used to distribute it. 
Shane: -Three of them, there were Crowbar, ASS and BSA 
Mick: Yeah. [laughs] 
Shane: Cause we had  
Mick: We had leaflets from all of them. [laughs] 
Shane: Yeah. Em 
Mick: Very useful stuff that was disseminated around the place, 
actually. 
Such literature is by no means unusual in this milieu, typically (like Ideal Home) 
focussed entirely on the practical (from advice on particular acts via discussion of 
eviction proceedings and details of how to defend a squat through to histories of 
successful squats and lists of contacts). Ideal Home thus fits into a history of 
systematic attempts at stabilising and developing particular forms of knowledge, 
which in the case of contemporary movements goes back at least to Nicholas 
Saunders' Alternative England and Wales (1975) and Abbie Hoffman's Steal this 
book (excerpted in Hoffman 1989). Comparable literature exists for continental 
Europe as well (from details of how to set up alternative radio stations (Network 
Medien-Cooperative 1983) to details of how to carry out actions against armaments 
firms (Maass 1983)), and of course much of the alternative press is devoted to such 
matters, from computer encryption to details of forthcoming demonstrations (for 
which Green Anarchist was recently closed down by the police). Skill can of course 
take less tangible or abstract forms than this; but I think this sufficiently illustrates 
the material and institutionalised nature of skill in social movement contexts. 
This ontology of skilled practical activity as the starting-point of human society, 
then, offers a more general and I think more fundamental starting-point for social 
movement research than one which assumes specific institutions and practices as 
defining; it directs attention precisely to the historical question of how skill is 
embodied in particular places at particular times; and it offers a direct connection to 
the other available starting-point for research, that of the conflictual social totality, 
to which I now turn. 
Movements, "imputed consciousness" and totality 
The passage from Gramsci I quoted earlier continues as follows: 
"The consciousness of being part of a given hegemonic force (that is, 
political consciousness) is the first phase in a further and progressive 
self-consciousness in which theory and practice are finally unified. 
The unity of theory and practice, then, is also not a given mechanical 
datum, but a historical becoming, which has its elementary and 
primitive phase in the sense of 'difference', of 'distance', of barely 
instinctive independence, and develops up to the real and complete 
possession of a coherent and unitary conception of the world" (1991: 
13 - 14). 
By implication, this political epistemology does not expect to find, in the normal 
state of affairs, fully-formulated movements from below that are capable of 
mounting a fully-fledged practical and theoretical challenge to the social totality; 
such a situation represents rather the limiting case of a counter-hegemonic project 
on the brink of revolution - as well, of course, as the normal situation of hegemonic 
movements from above. Nevertheless, it suggests that this limiting case is of great 
importance in representing the fullest possible self-expression of a given movement, 
as well as illuminating most clearly its relation to the social totality and to its 
opponents. What can this mean in practice for research on social movements? 
If our categories are to be historical, if they are to be geared to movements as they 
develop and are eroded over the short and long timescales of conflict, they must be 
oriented to the whole history of a movement, not simply to its current appearance at 
a single point in time. But how is this to be done? The western Marxist tradition 
offers two related ways of thinking the problem. The first is that outlined by Luk, 
in his discussion of "imputed class consciousness". It is interesting to note, given the 
disfavour into which the concept has fallen, that Luk himself thought that the 
concept was similar to Max Weber's "ideal type"; in other words that it was oriented 
to asking what, all other things being equal, one could expect the interests and self-
understanding of a particular social class to be: "class consciousness consists in fact 
of the appropriate and rational reactions 'imputed' to a particular typical position in 
the process of production" (1971: 51; cf. note 11 on p. 81 for the reference to 
Weber). The problems with this point of view hardly need to be stressed; ah it is 
interesting that the obvious criticism - that this legitimates virtually any external 
imposition in the name of the "true" interests of the working class - is frequently 
made when these interests are identified as revolutionary; rather less frequently 
when social interests are identified in more conservative terms. 
A second, less "contemplative" approach, to quote Luk' own later critique of this 
theory (1971: xix), is that offered by Alain Touraine (1981), in his methodology of 
"sociological intervention". This is geared to discovering, in his case through a 
complex dialogical procedure between the researchers and specially constituted 
focus groups drawn from movement activists and opponents, the highest possible 
self-expression of a given movement; in other words, starting from its actual 
position, to see how far and in what directions it is capable of understanding its own 
nature and interests, those of its opponents, and of articulating an independent 
social project. The underlying methodology has come in for strong criticism, which 
I think misinterprets its goal. Touraine is not trying, and the theory I have sketched 
out here is not trying, simply to describe the specific situation of particular 
organisations or social groups. Rather, it is trying to identify both the local 
rationalities which are at the root of a movement's support and the directions in 
which those rationalities are articulated, theoretically and practically. In other 
words, it is an attempt to extend the logic implicit in participants' skilled activity to a 
more comprehensive standpoint. To be sure, one is assuming that such a thing exists 
in some way. But it is worth remembering that this definition of movement leads us 
to look, not at all the membership of the Lower Uppington NIMBY Association, but 
rather at phenomena which are spread across considerable areas of time and space, 
which express themselves in a great variety of forms of social and political activity, 
which thematise many different issues and are capable of making some kind of bid 
for hegemony, however unlikely - and within these, at the "hegemonic" core which 
both makes possible this breadth of manifestations and which gives it coherence and 
direction.  
Two related assumptions have to be made to buttress this research strategy. These 
add up, I think, to what can be defined as a critical realist methodology (McLellan 
1981; cf. Cox 1994). Such a methodology operates on the realist assumption that 
there are underlying patterns to the immediately discoverable empirical world, and 
that these are at least indirectly knowable. It is critical in two respects: first, as we 
shall see shortly, in that it stresses the social relations of knowledge as a key element 
in its account of the process of discovery of this underlying real. Secondly, and 
perhaps more unusually, that its aims are explicitly interventionist. In Touraine's 
account, the point of such research depends on a rationalist strategy of bringing the 
movement - or at least the research participants - to a greater level of self-
knowledge along the dimensions already mentioned; somewhat like psychoanalysis 
for social movements. But if we consider what kind of knowledge is gained, and 
what its use might be, we can perhaps see another point. Clearly to discover this 
hegemonic project or highest potential of a movement is not to predict that it will in 
fact achieve this level of articulation. It is rather to say that this is the highest level of 
articulation that it is capable of achieving as a movement, and thus to say something 
both about its limits and its potential. This is the kind of knowledge which is useful 
to movement activists, and in particular to those movement activists who are 
capable of thinking not only strategically (in terms of the options available given a 
fixed situation) but of taking the "point of view of totality": of seeing the movement, 
its opponents and the social totality as all open to intervention and transformation. 
The politics of research 
But how is such knowledge generated? In the past two decades, the concept of 
reflexivity in methodology has gained considerable ground. One way of phrasing it 
is that there is no extra-social means of gaining knowledge of the social world, so 
that the means whereby that world is known - the social interactions entered into 
during the research process, and the situation and interests of the researcher 
themself - are a necessary part of that knowledge, not an unscientific accretion. 
Curiously, movement research has tended to make little or no reference to 
reflexivity. Yet two features of the concept are particularly interesting in the light of 
what I have said so far. The first is that its immediate antecedents are, precisely, 
movement-linked social theories: Marxism and feminism. The latter case is, 
perhaps, well-known; the former less readily recognised. And yet the proposition 
that all knowledge is socially located, that our understanding of the world is closely 
tied to our interests and our experience, and that there is nowhere outside this 
"radical sociality" where we could stand, is a basic presupposition of the Marxist 
theory of knowledge (e.g. Goldmann 1969). It is of course anathema to positivist 
theories of science; in subtler ways, it is rejected by both Weber and Mannheim. 
Secondly, and more interestingly, in a western Marxist context this proposition has 
a political and active edge which it tends to lose rapidly in other formulations. It is 
not a theory of a passive relation to knowledge given by virtue of simple oppression; 
rather, it has tended to be formulated in terms of the relationship between given 
theories and doctrines and their authors' political positions, organisational strategies 
and the social groups they sought to appeal to. Buried in the internecine polemics of 
the workers' movement is a sophisticated, and thoroughly "reflexive", conception of 
knowledge politics.  
Perhaps the most interesting feature of this conception is that it draws an implicit 
parallel between organising modes and strategies of research. Indeed, in western 
Marxist formulations the two are not necessarily distinguishable, and for good 
reasons: to know the world, in a critical realist perspective, entails a practical 
intervention, in that we only know the world insofar as we engage with it, and we 
only engage with it from the point of view of particular interests. The "politics of 
research" and the politics of social movements, then, are not two separate things. In 
each case, a movement is being "constructed" by the bringing together of spatially, 
socially and temporally scattered practices, by the attempt to relate the 
understandings of participants to one another and to a more general idea of the 
nature of the movement, one which also identifies the nature of the opposition and 
the political implications of the demands being made. To do this is then also to 
collude with the knowledge interests of some participants and to conflict with that 
of others; just as activists do, in other words, so researchers find themselves in 
practice agreeing to a greater or lesser extent with the way some participants see the 
movement, and organising their research accordingly, and disagreeing to a greater 
or lesser extent with other views, and organising the research in ways which tend to 
exclude these other definitions - of the boundaries of the movement, for example. 
This is, I think, inevitable if the research process is to involve any identification of an 
object of research, if it is to involve any method of engaging with that object, and if 
it is to result in any analysis whatsoever. Yet if this is the case, it becomes crucial to 
be able to give a clear account of the politics of a specific research process. 
How can we understand the practice of movement research, then? What are the 
knowledge interests of researchers, and how does their research activity position 
them in relation to the movement as a whole? It is conventional to start with 
discussions of who the researcher is and move "outwards" from this towards a 
discussion of how they do their research, while ignoring partly or entirely the 
question of where they do their research. This order suggests a peculiarly 
contemplative image of research, in which the researcher is essentially unaffected 
by their interaction with the people they are researching, and naturally avoids the 
political and activist implications I have just sketched out. Reversing this ordering 
may be of interest.  
Firstly, it is a strange feature of experience that reasons for selecting particular fields 
of study, within movement research at least, are rarely discussed. Often, it would 
seem, subjects for study are chosen pretty much "because they were there", with the 
implication that any other subject for study would have done equally well. The 
image this conjures up of a ready-made theory and method which can be made to 
fit any particular point on the social map is perhaps unfair; in some cases at least it 
is clear that topics for study are chosen because of personal interest or access, yet 
here again this is rarely theorised, and it is unclear how far this is a question of 
where people happened to find themselves and how far it is a matter of a personal 
commitment to a particularly important project. The image conjured up by the 
former, at least, is of an entirely flat social landscape, where the character of the 
knowledge gained in one location and of that gained in another is essentially 
identical. Yet precisely those arguments which ground a reflexive methodology 
suggest that this is not the case. Perhaps the most charitable suggestion is that the 
pressure to "do research" and the drive to credentialisation tend to make such 
questions seem naive. Social movement research may even be fortunate in the 
proportion of researchers who do have genuine reasons for the work they are doing 
and have made serious commitments to the areas they are studying. This is not 
simply an ethical question, but also, very obviously, an intellectual one: not only in 
that there is no intrinsic value in "lots of research being done" (7), but that if the 
researcher does not themself engage with the movement in question seriously, they 
are likely to learn as little as would participant observers who refused to take 
anything they saw seriously. Thirty years ago, Glaser and Strauss (1967) made the 
suggestion that the selection of areas for research should be based on the criterion of 
their possible contribution to the development of theory; with a more political tone, 
that still seems a useful encouragement. This is not, by any means, to suggest that all 
research should concentrate on the elites of proto-hegemonic movements; for one 
thing, such elites are probably capable of doing their own theorising. It is perhaps 
more to suggest that research should develop in a dialogue with movements, even 
perhaps to the extent of directing research into areas that the movements themselves 
are interested in rather than areas decided by the "traditional intellectuals" of the 
academy, whether that means young postgraduates or widely published researchers. 
A good example might be the German Green Party. Unusually within the ecological 
movement, it had during the 1980s a fair smattering of academics of its own, where 
the new movements are more commonly dependent on sympathetic and often over-
enthusiastic outsiders. Nevertheless, it made extensive and systematic use of outside 
researchers, particularly during its internal crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
publishing collections of contributions from sympathetic political scientists (Frank 
1991) and inviting them to address party meetings. One published a selection from 
his ongoing research as an explicit contribution to the discussions of that time 
(Raschke 1991). Over a somewhat longer period, members of the party elite (Antje 
Vollmer, Wolfgang Thierse) were and are involved in the journal of new social 
movement research, the Forschungsjournal neue soziale Bewegungen. This situation 
is perhaps unusual in terms of the level of competence and the scale of resources 
available to the party, but not otherwise. As TomJones has pointed out, there are 
strong dangers in a situation where research is guided by purely external criteria: 
the politics of European social movements research - and its funding - has shifted 
rightwards over the last two decades (1993: 7 - 8). To take the most alarming 
example, Diani and Eyerman's otherwise fascinating volume (1992) on the 
methodology of social movements research came out of a European Consortium for 
Political Research session jointly sponsored by the Italian Consiglio Nazionale delle 
Ricerche and ... the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, a fact mentioned without 
comment in the introduction to the volume. 
This discussion of the purposes of research obviously ties into the question of how 
research is done. This is rather more familiar ground in discussions of reflexivity, 
and I only want to make two points. The first is to add to the discussion of research 
methods, and the kinds of social and power relations these set up between 
researchers and participants, a discussion of the conditions for the employment of 
these research methods. The application of particular "methods" always takes place 
in a context of power and inequality; in the case of a social movement, typically one 
of conflict as well. What situation does the researcher have to be in to use particular 
methods? I want to consider two examples, from opposite ends of the spectrum. In 
one case, the use of in-depth interviews with members of radical political and social 
groups, it is clear that to get anything more than "official stories" or even blank 
refusals a reasonable level of trust is needed. This is frequently gained in practice by 
researchers participating and contributing to the movement in ways that can 
convince participants of their bona fides: whether this is a matter of going on 
demonstrations, living on sites, or running the office. In the other case, that of the 
elaborate methods recommended by Touraine (1981) and Melucci (1989), the 
business of organising large focus-group type events, with video recordings in 
Melucci's case, and in Touraine's case multiple iterations, seems clearly to rest either 
on high levels of prestige and resources on the part of the researcher (the methods 
call for several interviewers) or for explicit deals with some of those involved 
(which Melucci discusses at some length). Examples could be multiplied, but clearly 
these general research situations - not simply the "methods", abstracted from the 
actual social context - need to be examined critically. 
My second point is perhaps simpler. It is not, I think, enough to describe the 
research process, even in these expanded terms, and leave it at that. What is 
important, for much the same reasons as in participant observation, is a way of 
bringing research to engage with the politics of the participants. The point in 
discussions of reflexivity is that the researcher's own standpoint and knowledge 
interests cannot be separated from the research process. Yet if all that is done is to 
describe retrospectively what they did, and not why, little has been gained. It has 
frequently been suggested that more dialogue between researchers and participants 
would not be a bad thing; how much more than lip service is paid to this is hard to 
tell. One problem with it, as I can attest from my own research, is that it runs up 
against the pressure both parties are under (for rather different reasons), and seems 
to be superfluous to the central interests of both. A subsidiary problem is the 
question of comprehension. Both participants and outsiders are liable to find social 
theory in some respects difficult to grasp. This is not, I think, so much a question of 
vocabulary and training as it is of content. When presented with documents written 
in jargon, we tend to look for the point, as we conceive it; if we find none, we give 
up on comprehension. To engage in dialogue with movement participants, then, 
researchers would need to have something to say to them that participants would 
recognise as a pointful statement. In other words, to solve the subsidiary problem we 
need to tackle the main one: to find ways of communicating that are not superfluous 
to what participants are engaged in, thus to produce research whose politics are of 
interest to the participants. Obviously the scope for this is immense, from actively 
taking sides in movement politics to writing for the alternative press. This 
engagement, however, also needs to be valuable to the researcher within the terms 
of their own research activity. 
One, very obvious value is that there is no better way to improve your thinking than 
to have it criticised by people who know the situation you are talking about - and 
those are often few and far between in academia. Secondly, and perhaps less 
crudely, there is the issue of how we formulate and communicate our 
understanding. It is well known that examples, illustrations, quotes, metaphors and 
so on can make a text much more readable, but why? In this case at least, I think it 
is because this kind of struggle to communicate our meaning to the widest possible 
spectrum of viewpoints is effectively a "hegemonising" skill. It is not so much by 
offering an external interpretation of a movement, as through providing an image 
or a phrase which connects up both multiple knowledge interests within the 
movement and the knowledge interests of the researcher, that researchers can 
ground their research in the totality of a movement. In other words, through 
communicating with movement participants we come to engage more fully with the 
movement as a living problem and not simply as an isolated data set. Obviously this 
communication is extremely precarious, and remains so to the extent that it does not 
develop into the coordination of shared activity. A brief research project does not 
necessarily contribute much in this direction. There are, then, some intellectual 
advantages to research on movements we are committed to and people we live with: 
the more important our communication with the people we are researching is to us, 
the more we will work on it and the harder we will think about it. "Smash-and-grab 
research" is precisely the activity of researchers who have no intention of 
maintaining contact with participants, and who only have to convince academic 
peers of the value of their research. This is, I think, a stronger form of reflexivity 
than the simple sharing of backgrounds. 
Finally, what can research contribute, and to whom? It should at this point be fairly 
obvious that to think of it in these terms is slightly misleading. Research being a 
political activity, it is (in some ways) good news to some participants and (in some 
ways) bad news to others. Perhaps more importantly, it is immediately received, 
translated and made use of by different participants for different purposes. Yet not 
all such purposes are equal; and the point of the "western Marxist" research strategy 
I have outlined is geared precisely to this fact: to contributing a picture of the 
movement as a whole, to elaborating its practical rationalities and strategic 
directions, and to noting its limitations and its potential. Other research strategies 
have rather different purposes, ranging from simple dismissal of awkward 
phenomena to organisational discussions likely to be of most use either to the police 
or to movement bureaucrats. The western Marxist strategy has at least this much to 
recommend it: that its aims in effect orient it to the interests of the movement as a 
whole and to those of its participant core; and that it tries to come to the most 
complex and powerful understanding that can be gained from research on the 
movement. 
History of a research process 
I want to conclude this paper with a brief analysis of my own research process as an 
example of some of the issues I have covered in this second half of the paper. The 
danger in "reflexivity" of this kind, of course, is that it can easily become self-
indulgent, if the claim that our own situation as researchers is an important point of 
analysis is not taken seriously. To take it seriously, of course, is to subject such 
analysis to the same kinds of theoretical and political criticism as any other 
statements, rather than to shield them with claims to personal authenticity, identity, 
and so on. 
My current research (Cox 1997), now coming to a close, started from an interest in 
understanding and locating a "counter-cultural" network of friends based in Dublin, 
but including emigrants in Britain, Europe, America and Australia, formed in Irish 
student politics and London squats, and regularly involved in social movement 
activity of different kinds. The impulse for the research came from my own 
association with them, and my own activities as one of the "intellectuals" of the 
group. Attempts at developing this kind of understanding were and are absolutely 
normal among this well-read, if largely self-educated, group, so that the research in 
effect consisted in following a line traced from within this milieu. Pursuing this 
project, I went first to Hamburg to carry out research; as a postgrad, the research 
became a defining feature of my situation as researcher and teaching assistant, and 
came to involve attempting to bring the activities I was already familiar with into 
the externally-defined categories of the conventional social movements literature. At 
the same time, this "theoretical" history was paralleled by a political one. In Dublin, 
as an active member of the milieu, I had been involved in what were essentially its 
self-controlled activities: a college occupation, a student peace society, a semi-
anarchist group, later street theatre and the attempt to set up an infoshop among 
others. In Hamburg, however, as part of my research I joined the German Green 
Party, coming to act as liaison between the Party and a peace camp during the Gulf 
War, and later helping run a local section. Returning to Dublin, the distancing of 
my theoretical understanding from the local intellectual forms of the milieu was 
paralleled by increased involvement with the Irish Green Party: running the college 
branch, editing the party's theoretical journal and eventually coming to act as the 
party's European representative (8). There is, the, at least a structural parallel 
between the theoretical and organising relationships involved at each point in time, 
and one which suggests that an account of the latter is by no means irrelevant to the 
discussion of the former. 
This history also strikes me as a disturbing contrast to Gramsci's discussion of 
traditional and organic intellectuals. Gramsci's traditional intellectuals were those 
belonging, in training and particularly in their social situation, to already-existing 
social movements: priests and doctors, for example. While individuals drawn from 
these groups - such as himself, whose father had been a disgraced bureaucrat and 
whose incompleted education was in areas such as linguistics and philosophy - 
would necessarily form part of the first intellectual cadres of new movements, 
eventually those movements would form intellectuals of their own, capable of 
speaking "in their own language". This was clearly a necessary part of the 
development of hegemony. Yet the example I have just given seems to me far more 
characteristic of the situation since the 1960s at least, in that those who have some 
intellectual and organising status in the movements of this period are likely to be 
students, teachers and other state employees. There are clearly areas where this is 
less true, but if we are thinking in Gramsci's terms of the development of hegemony, 
the extent to which even contemporary Marxism and feminism depend on the 
academy, and the lack of control over institutions of their own, is deeply worrying. 
A situation where the bulk of social movement research is carried out within the 
framework of traditional intellectual activity - in terms of the categories I have 
outlined earlier, within the institutional forms of social movements from above - 
should, I think, be cause for concern. 
Thankfully, however, the situation is not one where participants are purely passive 
and only intellectuals (organisers, theorists) are active. Participants, rather, are 
themselves creative agents who are thoroughly capable of "locating" these 
intellectuals and fitting their activity in turn into their own perspectives and 
projects. A few obvious examples can be given from my own research. One, relating 
to movement organisation, is that of participant discourses around what they 
perceive as formally or artificially organised events. Despite both their participation 
in externally organised events such as demonstrations and in internally organised 
parties, squats, projects and so on, a number of participants made comments in 
interviews such as "nothing happened unless you organised it", suggesting here a 
distinction between the "organic" and the artificial, and also discussed the value 
such events had for them in their own terms - as occasions to meet one another and 
exchange news, to organise other things, and so on. A second, relating to research, 
is that of interview transcripts, copies of which I have given back to participants as 
the transcripts have been completed, and papers based on them. Unlike what might 
be expected from movement organisers and formal groups, participants showed no 
interest in making changes - other than corrections of transcription - to the 
transcripts, of controlling the presentation of the group or of challenging the 
analysis in any way. What they were deeply concerned about was their own 
anonymity, partly in relation to the police, but also in relation to each other. That 
this latter concern was justified is shown by the fact that on most accounts one of 
the most abiding features of interest in copies of papers I have given them is 
identifying the pseudonymous authors of particular statements. Participants, then, 
are fully capable of locating the activity of intellectuals and using it for their own 
purposes. This does not, of course, mean that participants have no interest in the 
issues they are themselves working on or in the possibility of social change. Rather, 
they formulate these possibilities in ways which are so different from those 
preferred in academia and political parties that they tend to see activity in these 
fields as largely irrelevant, and find what they see as more practical ways of 
resolving the problems in question. 
Given this, what if anything can research contribute, and what are its limits? It is 
perhaps inevitable that theorists feel they do have something to contribute, and even 
that they feel it is more valuable than the understandings of other participants. For 
obvious reasons, it may be worth while suspending judgement on this claim, and 
instead concluding with three concrete examples from this research that may make 
it easier to answer the question. One, the most basic, is the example of interviews 
and transcripts. With only one exception, all participants have expressed a great 
deal of interest in their own interview transcripts, and in at least one case have 
circulated the transcript further (despite earlier concerns about anonymity!) It 
seems that the lapse of time between interview and transcription (1 - 2 years) and 
the unusual experience of seeing accurate transcriptions of one's own speech, made 
reading transcripts something which could be done with sufficient "distance" to be 
useful and "objectifying", in other words to help participants gain a clearer sense of 
their own self-understanding and history: an important part of "intervention" 
research. A second example, at the other end of the spectrum, is that participants 
have given me considerable assistance in producing an alternative magazine that 
grows out of much the same roots as the research. It is hard to know precisely what 
value they feel it has, but help has often been given unsolicited, which suggests that 
it is contributing to the shared project. Thirdly, as I have mentioned earlier, prior to 
the specific methods and process of research are the social conditions of research. 
To research a milieu means among other things to find a way of taking part in it and 
contributing in whatever way one can to that milieu. Thus, for example, one part of 
this role was for several years to maintain as an open room a college society which 
served as a crashpad, a drop-in centre, a library and other things for members of 
the milieu.  
Such contributions do not, I think, add up to a picture of the leading role of Theory 
and Organisation; despite proceeding out of them, they suggest that their main 
contribution has to be analysed from the point of view of movement participants. 
Touraine suggests at one point that the process of intervention research is concluded 
when participants have come to adopt a more adequate understanding of the 
movement; I want to conclude with the suggestion that we might also ask whether 
the researchers have come to engage more closely with the participants. 
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Footnotes 
(1) I wish to thank Colin Barker for the discussions which 
provoked this paper, Hilary Tovey for comments on an earlier 
version and Anna Mazzoldi for assistance with the 
translations from Gramsci. Back 
(2) Although I will not pursue the problem here, a similar 
paradox exists within feminism: a theory born of social 
movements, often oriented to the needs of social movements, 
but which has not to my knowledge generated any 
independent theories of social movements. Back 
(3) The major problem with the usage I am adopting is that it 
excludes the bulk of the critical theory tradition, a tradition 
which only on occasion (as with Marcuse) approaches this 
perspective. Back 
(4) I share with Roger Gottlieb (1989: 20 - 22) the view that 
socialist feminism represents a contemporary development of 
western Marxism and a "fulfillment of the western Marxist 
project". Back 
(5) Alain Touraine's theory, despite its questionable adoption 
of the language of "post-industrialism", has the merit of 
offering a contemporary illustration of the different structural 
and ontological implications of such a theory. Back 
(6) It also has something of the implication of a purely ideal 
logic, which pre-exists material and institutional forms of 
"embodiment"; as I will shortly argue, the category of skill 
offers a materially embodied way of grasping the nature of 
human practices. Back 
(7) In fact, there may be negative political implications for 
movements, depending on the demands made on participants 
and the use made of the research. Back 
(8) Subsequently I have ceased to be active in the Green Party, 
devoting myself instead to forms of activity geared to 
developing the self-understanding of contemporary Irish 
alternative movements through a variety of attempts at fora 
geared to "bringing the movement together" and a now 
independent journal. This naturally makes it considerably 
easier to organise research along similar lines. Back 
 
